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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is the second time this case has been before this court.  The action was 
brought by Pamela Couden and her six children pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against 
New Castle County police officers Jay Freebery and James Armstrong and others 
alleging defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court Judge 
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.  Couden v. Duffey, 305 F. Supp. 2d 
379 (D. Del. 2004).  On the first appeal, we reversed the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Freebery and Armstrong, holding that the District Court did not view the facts in 
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the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as required.  Couden v. Duffey, 446 F.3d 483 (3d 
Cir. 2006).   
 After further discovery, Freebery and Armstrong again moved for summary 
judgment.  The matter came before a Magistrate Judge who denied summary judgment as 
to the claim that Armstrong unconstitutionally seized Pamela and her four youngest 
children while in their vehicle and Adam Couden’s claim that Armstrong and two other 
officers used excessive force to arrest him.  Couden v. Duffey, 533 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. 
Del. 2008).  However, the District Court granted summary judgment as to the claim that 
Freebery used excessive force when he threw his flashlight through the front passenger 
side-door window of the Coudens’ car and Adam’s claim that Freebery facilitated the use 
of excessive force against Adam by “restrain[ing]” Tiffany Couden (who was in the 
house) while other officers arrested Adam.1  The Coudens appeal.       
I. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-appellants, the record supports 
the following facts.  At around 8:00 in the evening on April 12, 2001, Officers Armstrong 
and Freebery were parked in an unmarked vehicle on the corner of Sanford Drive and 
Argyle Drive, Newark, Delaware, staking out the home located at 7 Sanford, three houses 
down from the corner.  While parked, they observed a car pull up to the sideyard of the 
corner home, 3 Sanford.  A male wearing an orange sweatshirt exited the car and walked 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Magistrate Judge certified the case pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and stayed the claims against defendants other than Freebery 
pending this appeal. 
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across the sideyard to the backyard where he entered the garage of 3 Sanford.  After a 
few minutes, the car pulled into the driveway with its lights on and sounded its horn.  
Armstrong and Freebery, dressed in street clothes, then exited their vehicle.  Freebery 
went to the backyard.  Armstrong approached the car with his gun drawn as it sat running 
in the driveway. 
The car was being driven by Pamela Couden and the backseat was occupied by her 
four youngest children, Nicholas, 11, Jordan, 9, Luke, 7, and Micah, 4.  The person who 
had exited the car to enter the garage was Adam Couden, Pamela’s 14 year old son.  The 
Coudens were the residents of 3 Sanford.   
Once Pamela noticed the man approaching her car through her yard, she asked her 
children if they recognized him.  They did not.  She then noticed that he had a gun and 
stated as much, causing her children to scream in alarm.  Officer Armstrong never 
showed his badge and once he reached the car attempted to open the locked front driver 
side door.  Frightened, Pamela first put her car in neutral before successfully putting it 
into drive.  She then steered to the left to avoid going straight into the garage and drove 
into the sideyard.  She then veered to the right in order to avoid a tree and exited, 
unobstructed, onto Argyle Drive.  While Pamela was driving through the sideyard, 
Freebery ran from the backyard towards the car with his gun drawn and threw his 
flashlight through the front passenger side-door window, shattering the glass and causing 
minor injuries to some of the occupants.   
The precise location and trajectory of both Freebery and the car are disputed and 
serve as the focal point of the current appeal as these facts will determine whether 
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Freebery was in any immediate danger and accordingly whether his decision to throw the 
flashlight was an objectively reasonable one.   
At his deposition, Freebery described the vehicle as traveling at a “high rate of 
speed” and claimed that he threw the flashlight “in an attempt to stop [the car] and in an 
attempt to get the hell out of the way.”  App. at 183-84.  Armstrong described the vehicle 
as driving “erratically,” but testified that at no point did he see Freebery in front of the 
vehicle.  App. at 218.  Instead, he stated that he saw Freebery to the side of the vehicle.   
Micah, the youngest of Couden’s children, described the car as swerving to avoid 
a tree, but specifically denied that Freebery was in front of the car, instead testifying that 
Freebery was to the right of the car.  Jordan similarly testified that Freebery “was off 
towards the right.”  App. at 285.  Nicholas testified that Freebery was running at the car 
from the backyard, that Pamela was not driving in Freebery’s direction, and that he saw 
Freebery on the right out of the front passenger window about 10 or 15 feet away from 
the car.   
Pamela testified that once she got the car in drive her “foot was all the way to the 
floor.”  App. at 357.  She also testified that she swerved left to avoid the garage, and then 
swerved again (presumably to the right) to avoid the tree that sat in the front of the 
sideyard.  She testified that after she swerved to avoid the tree, she could see Freebery 
“charging” toward the vehicle from the side, “[b]ut he didn’t get close,” and was “several 
feet away” as she went past him just before the glass shattered.  App. at 357.   
Freebery’s supervisor, Lt. Quinton Watson, disciplined Freebery for throwing the 
flashlight.  The written “record of discipline” describes Freebery moving out of the way 
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of the vehicle and then throwing his flashlight “as [the car] passed him in an attempt to 
‘stop’ the fleeing vehicle.”  App. at 107.  The report concludes that “[t]his type of force 
was deemed unreasonable and the use of Freebery’s flashlight in this situation 
unjustifiable.”  Id.  When asked why he deemed the use of the flashlight unreasonable, 
Watson testified that the flashlight could injure the occupants, distract the driver, and 
cause the vehicle to careen “out of control.”  App. at 409.   
II. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary 
judgment, applying the same test as the district court to determine if there are any issues 
of material fact.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 633-34 (3d Cir. 
2009).  The appellants, as the non-moving parties on summary judgment, are entitled to 
every favorable inference that can be drawn from the record.  Kach, 589 F.3d at 633-34.   
III. 
 Freebery claims that his decision to throw the flashlight, undisputedly a use of 
force and a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, is protected by qualified immunity.   
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons . 
. . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  We have explained 
that qualified immunity involves two questions.  First, as relevant here, whether the facts, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Coudens, show that Freebery’s conduct violated 
a constitutional right, or, as we previously rephrased the inquiry:  whether Freebery’s 
“actions [and beliefs were] objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting him.”  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2002) (quotations 
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omitted).  In evaluating whether Freebery’s use of force was proportional in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, the issue raised here is whether the Coudens posed an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.  See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 
279, 289-92 (3d Cir. 1999).  As the District Court suggested, the most salient “factor [in 
this case] is whether the [automobile driven by Pamela] pose[d] an immediate threat to 
the safety of Freebery or others.”  Couden, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 501.   
  In attempting to view the facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, the 
District Court stated that it would “assume that the car was not coming directly at 
Freebery; rather, that Freebery was to the side of the vehicle.”  Id.  But when it applied 
the facts, the District Court emphasized that the car was traveling erratically and “coming 
in [Freebery’s] general direction.”  Id. at 502.  In its oral ruling denying appellants’ 
motion for reargument, the District Court, cutting a very fine line, insisted that it assumed 
Freebery was not directly in front of the vehicle, but nevertheless concluded that he was 
“within a zone of danger.”  App. at 48.  The District Court also characterized Freebery’s 
movement toward the vehicle as being part of his investigative duties.  Consequently, the 
District Court reasoned, “Freeberry threw his flashlight at the vehicle – a reflexive 
reaction – to prevent the car from hitting him.”  Couden, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
 Pamela’s own testimony supports a conclusion that she was driving quickly and 
swerved twice.  But by extrapolating from her testimony that her entire path was erratic 
and that Freebery was in the “zone of danger,” the District Court made inferences against 
the plaintiff-appellants, rather than in their favor.  Pamela’s testimony, if credited, 
establishes that when she finished swerving to avoid the tree, Freebery was still at her 
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right, and therefore arguably out of danger.  Indeed, although a crystal clear picture of 
what occurred is difficult to ascertain, the gestalt of the Coudens’ testimony is consistent 
and relatively plain:  Freebery was some distance to the side of the car, ran toward it, and 
then threw his flashlight.  A jury would be entitled to credit this testimony which is 
supported by the undisputed fact that the flashlight went through the front passenger  
side-door window, not the windshield.   
The District Court also failed to properly consider the disciplinary report of Lt. 
Watson because it deemed that the report and Watson’s subsequent testimony were 
irrelevant “legal conclusions.”  App. at 49.2  However, Watson’s written description of 
the events, which was signed by Freebery, contains relevant factual evidence apart from 
any of Watson’s conclusions.  Most notably, Watson’s report states that Freebery threw 
the flashlight in an effort to stop the fleeing vehicle after he was already out of the 
vehicle’s way, indicating that Freebery did not throw the flashlight for his own defense.   
When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-appellants, the 
facts would permit a jury to conclude that Freebery was not in imminent danger and that 
his decision to throw the flashlight, an undisputedly highly dangerous activity that could 
have wreaked significant, lethal damage, was unreasonable, violating the Coudens’ rights 
                                              
2 The Supreme Court has held that local police enforcement practices and 
regulations may not be relied on as evidence of whether a seizure was objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815-16 
(1996).  Accordingly, to the extent that Watson’s report deems Freebery’s actions as 
unreasonable based on violation of local procedures, it has no bearing on reasonableness 




under the Fourth Amendment.3  The Supreme Court has held that absent an immediate 
threat to an officer or others, such a use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect is 
objectively unreasonable.  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).  
 Although the reasonableness of force is a factually intensive inquiry, our 
conclusion that there are disputed issues of material fact is supported by our decision in 
Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999).  Abraham addressed whether an officer 
used excessive force when she shot a bullet through the side window of a moving car that 
was headed in the officer’s general direction in a parking lot.   “[T]he undisputed facts 
[were that Abraham] had stolen some clothing, resisted arrest, hit or bumped into a car 
[while backing his car out of the parking lot], and was reasonably believed to be 
intoxicated.”  Id. at 293.  Once he had successfully pulled his car out of the parking spot, 
Abraham started heading in the general direction of the police officer, Raso.  The parties, 
as in this case, disputed whether the officer was directly in front of the car or to the side 
of the car.  Largely because the bullet came through the side window, we held that a 
                                              
3 The District Court, noting that we have not specifically ruled on whether expert 
opinion can be used to demonstrate a police officer’s reasonableness under qualified 
immunity, also refused to consider the report of plaintiffs’ expert, Prof. McCauley, 
because it essentially offered his legal conclusion that Freebery’s actions were 
objectively unreasonable.  Because the remaining admissible evidence is sufficient to 
survive summary judgment, we need not reach the issue of the admissibility of the 
expert’s report.  However, we note our conflicting approaches to such evidence in the 
past.  On occasion, we have relied on experts’ conclusions, including Prof. McCauley’s, 
as relevant evidence regarding whether police conduct was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Compare Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)  
(relying on expert’s conclusions as relevant evidence regarding the reasonableness of 
police conduct), with Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 243-44 (3d Cir. 
2004) (discounting such expert testimony).   
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reasonable jury could conclude that the officer was on the side of the car and was not in 
imminent danger and, therefore, that her use of force was unreasonable.  Id. 
A jury in this case could make the same finding, particularly because several 
circumstances indicating that Abraham posed a risk are not present here.  Abraham had 
already hit one car and was reasonably presumed to be intoxicated, strengthening the 
reasonableness of any officer’s belief that while behind the wheel Abraham was a danger 
to the police officer, or others.  We conclude that the facts in this case, viewed most 
favorably to the appellants, would permit a jury to find Freebery violated the Coudens’ 
constitutional right.   
We thus turn to the second qualified immunity question:  whether the right in 
question was clearly established or, put differently, “whether it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”  Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).  “Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair 
notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness [in this context] is judged against 
the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.”  Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 
198 (2004).  “[T]here does not have to be precise factual correspondence between the 
case at issue and a previous case in order for a right to be clearly established . . . .”  
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).  However, in a 
close case, “a broad general proposition” of the law will not serve to clearly establish to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.  Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quotations 
omitted).   
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 Our decision in Abraham, which was issued prior to the conduct in question, is 
sufficiently similar to the facts of this case so as to make it clear to a reasonable officer 
that his conduct, as described by the plaintiff-appellants, was unlawful.   As discussed, 
Abraham held that it was unreasonable for an officer to fire a bullet into the side of the 
car even when the car had already hit another car and the driver was reasonably believed 
to be intoxicated.  Accordingly, a reasonable officer would have known that throwing a 
flashlight into a moving car, which was not headed directly towards the officer, was 
equally if not more unreasonable under the law.4   
 With regard to Adam Couden’s claim that Freebery used excessive force by 
restraining Tiffany while other officers arrested Adam, we affirm for substantially the 
reasons stated in the District Court’s opinion—the facts, even when viewed most 
favorably to Adam, simply do not support the claim.  Tiffany testified that Freebery 
initially restrained her for her “protection.”  App. at 326.  Although upon seeing Adam 
she told the officers that he was her brother and to stop arresting him, she never testified 
that she tried to “assist[] Adam while the other Defendants assaulted Adam.”  Appellants’ 
                                              
4 It is important to note that our decision denying qualified immunity is a limited 
one: qualified immunity is not warranted at the summary judgment stage in this case as to 
the flashlight claim.  Because qualified immunity hinges, in large part, on a determination 
of the facts, it “remains a viable defense, though its applicability cannot be finally 
determined until after the facts have been [established] at trial.”  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 
F.3d 197, 224 n.38 (3d Cir. 2010).  To that end, we note that when a case involves several 
interrelated claims, some of which the district court believes should proceed to trial, 
judicial economy and the parties’ interest in final resolution may suggest that the district 
court reserve judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, notwithstanding that it is an 
immunity from suit, in order to more fully develop the facts and avoid the multiple 






                                             
Br. at 30.  Even assuming Tiffany was trying to free her brother, it would have been 
objectively reasonable for Freebery to prevent her from interfering while other officers 
made an arrest.5    
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Freebery as to the excessive force claim related to the flashlight incident and remand 
for resolution by the jury of the disputed issues of material fact.  We affirm the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Freebery as to Adam Couden’s claim that Freebery used 








5 Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995), is not to the contrary.  In 
that case, we held that the defendant could be held personally liable for other officers’ 
excessive force because the defendant both knew of the excessive treatment and was the 
supervisor.  Culpability was based on supervisory liability.  Id. at 1193-94.  Nowhere is it 
alleged that Freebery was in a supervisory position.  Appellants point to no case law that 
would clearly establish to a reasonable officer that his actions in restraining Tiffany were 
unlawful.  We also affirm the dismissal of Adam’s claim that Freebery used excessive 
force in slamming the garage door into Adam while trying to open it.  Adam cites to 
nothing in the record indicating that Freebery was the officer who slammed the door into 
him.  Adam merely states that “this unknown officer could have been Freebery.”  
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 7.  Absent evidence indicating that it was Freebery, no jury 
could grant a verdict in Adam’s favor.  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment on this claim.    
